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Abstract
Woo and Lam propose correspondence assertions for specifying authenticity properties of se-
curity protocols. Prior work on checking correspondence assertions depends on model-checking
and is limited to 4nite-state systems. We propose a dependent type and e(ect system for check-
ing correspondence assertions. Since it is based on type-checking, our method is not limited
to 4nite-state systems. This paper presents our system in the simple and general setting of the
-calculus. We show how to type-check correctness properties of example communication pro-
tocols based on secure channels. In a related paper, we extend our system to the more complex
and speci4c setting of checking cryptographic protocols based on encrypted messages sent over
insecure channels.
c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Correspondence assertions: To a 4rst approximation, a correspondence assertion
about a communication protocol is an intention that follows the pattern:
If one principal ever reaches a certain point in a protocol, then some other principal
has previously reached some other matching point in the protocol.
We record such intentions by annotating the program representing the protocol with
labelled assertions of the form beginL or endL. These assertions have no e(ect at run-
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time, but notionally indicate that a principal has reached a certain point in the protocol.
The following more accurately states the intention recorded by these annotations:
If the program embodying the protocol ever asserts end L, then there is a distinct
previous assertion of begin L.
Woo and Lam [30] introduce correspondence assertions to state intended properties of
authentication protocols based on cryptography. Consider a protocol where a principal
a generates a new session key k and transmits it to b. We intend that if a run of b
ends a key exchange believing that it has received key k from a, then a generated
k as part of a key exchange intended for b. We record this intention by annotating
a’s generation of k by the label begin 〈a; b; k〉, and b’s reception of k by the label
end 〈a; b; k〉.
A protocol can fail a correspondence assertion because of several kinds of bug.
One kind consists of those bugs that cause the protocol to go wrong without any
external interference. Other kinds are bugs where an unreliable or malicious network
or participant causes the protocol to fail. Such bugs include vulnerabilities to attacks
such as replay or man-in-the-middle attacks, where an active opponent on the network
can cause b to accept a message more times than it was sent, or to accept a message
as if it came from a when in fact it came from the opponent.
This paper: We show in this paper that correctness properties expressed by cor-
respondence assertions can be proved by type-checking. We embed correspondence
assertions in a concurrent programming language (the -calculus of Milner et al. [21])
and present a new type and e(ect system that guarantees safety of well-typed asser-
tions. We show several examples of how correspondence assertions can be proved by
type-checking.
Woo and Lam’s paper introduces correspondence assertions but provides no tech-
niques for proving them. Clarke and Marrero [5] use correspondence assertions to spec-
ify properties of e-commerce protocols, such as authorizations of transactions. Lowe
[18] discusses several forms of authenticity property achieved by security protocols; in
his terminology, correspondence assertions are “injective agreement” properties. Prior
work on checking correspondence assertions includes a project by Marrero et al. [20]
to apply model-checking techniques to 4nite-state versions of security protocols. Since
our work is based on type-checking, it is not limited to 4nite state systems. Moreover,
type-checking is compositional: we can verify components in isolation, and know that
their composition is safe, without having to verify the entire system. Unlike the work
of Marrero et al., however, the system of the present paper does not deal with cryp-
tographic primitives, and nor does it deal with an arbitrary opponent. Still, in another
paper [9], we adapt our type and e(ect system to the setting of the spi-calculus [1], an
extension of the -calculus with abstract cryptographic primitives. This adaptation can
show, moreover, that properties hold in the presence of an arbitrary untyped opponent.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce correspondence as-
sertions, by example, in Section 2. Section 3 introduces a typed -calculus in which
correspondence assertions may be veri4ed by type-checking. Section 4 explains several
applications. Section 5 explains the soundness proof for our type system. Section 6
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discusses related work and Section 7 concludes. An appendix includes proofs of the
two theorems stated in the main body of the paper.
A conference paper contains part of the material of this paper [10].
Review of the untyped -Calculus Milner, Parrow, and Walker’s -calculus is a
concurrent formalism to which many kinds of concurrent computation may be re-
duced. Its simplicity makes it an attractive vehicle for developing the ideas of this
paper, while its generality suggests they may be widely applicable. Its basic data
type is the name, an unguessable identi4er for a communications channel. Compu-
tation is based on the exchange of messages, tuples of names, on named channels.
Programming in the -calculus is based on the following constructs (written, unusu-
ally, with keywords, for the sake of clarity). The rest of the paper contains many
examples. An output process out x〈y1; : : : ; yn〉 represents a message 〈y1; : : : ; yn〉 sent
on the channel x. An input process inp x(z1; : : : ; zn);P blocks till it 4nds a message
sent on the channel x, reads the names in the message into the variables z1; : : : ; zn,
and then runs P. The process P | Q is the parallel composition of the two pro-
cesses P and Q; the two may run independently or communicate on shared chan-
nels. The name generation process new(x);P generates a fresh name, calls it x, then
runs P. Unless P reveals x, no other process can use this fresh name. The repli-
cation process repeat P behaves like an unbounded parallel array of replicas of P.
The process stop represents inactivity; it does nothing. Finally, the conditional if x =
y then P else Q compares the names x and y. If they are the same it runs P; otherwise
it runs Q.
2. Correspondence assertions, by example
This section introduces the idea of de4ning correspondence assertions by annotating
code with begin- and end-events. We give examples of both safe code and of un-
safe code, that is, of code that satis4es the correspondence assertions induced by its
annotations, and of code that does not.
A transmit-acknowledge handshake is a standard communications idiom, easily ex-
pressed in the -calculus: along with the actual message, the sender transmits an
acknowledgement channel, upon which the receiver sends an acknowledgement. We
intend that:
During a transmit-acknowledge handshake, if the sender receives an acknowledg-
ment, then the receiver has obtained the message.
Correspondence assertions can express this intention formally. Suppose that a and b
are the names of the sender and receiver, respectively. We annotate the code of the
receiver b with a begin-assertion at the point after it has received the message msg. We
annotate the code of the sender a with an end-assertion at the point after it has received
the acknowledgement. We label both assertions with the names of the principals and
the transmitted message, 〈a; b;msg〉. Hence, we assert that if after sending msg to
b, the sender a receives an acknowledgement, then a distinct run of b has received
msg.
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Suppose that c is the name of the channel on which principal b receives messages
from a. Here is the -calculus code of the annotated sender and receiver:
Rcver(a; b; c),
inp c(msg; ack);
begin 〈a; b;msg〉;
out ack〈〉
Snder(a; b; c),
new(msg); new(ack);
out c〈msg; ack〉; inp ack();
end 〈a; b;msg〉
The sender creates a fresh message msg and a fresh acknowledgement channel ack,
sends the two on the channel c, waits for an acknowledgement, and then asserts an
end-event labelled 〈a; b;msg〉.
The receiver gets the message msg and the acknowledgement channel ack o( c,
asserts a begin-event labelled 〈a; b;msg〉, and sends an acknowledgement on ack.
For the sake of simplicity, in this paper we represent the principal associated with
code only informally, outside our -calculus. The names of de4nitions, and their pa-
rameters, should suggest the owner of each process.
We say a program is safe if it satis4es the intentions induced by the begin- and end-
assertions. More precisely, a program is safe just if for every run of the program and
for every label L, there is a distinct begin-event labelled L preceding every end-event
labelled L. (We formalize this de4nition in Section 5.)
Here are three combinations of our examples: two safe, one unsafe.
new(c);
Snder(a; b; c) |
Rcver(a; b; c)
(Example 1: safe)
Example 1 uses one instance of the sender and one instance of the receiver to represent
a single instance of the protocol. The restriction new(c); makes the channel c private
to the sender and the receiver. This assembly is safe; its only run correctly implements
the handshake protocol.
new(c);
Snder(a; b; c) |
Snder(a; b; c) |
repeat Rcver(a; b; c)
(Example 2: safe)
Example 2 uses two copies of the sender—representing two attempts by a single prin-
cipal a to send a message to b—and a replicated copy of the receiver—representing the
principal b willing to accept an unbounded number of messages. Again, this assembly
is safe; any run consists of an interleaving of two correct handshakes.
new(c);
Snder(a; b; c) |
Snder(a′; b; c) |
repeat Rcver(a; b; c)
(Example 3: unsafe)
Example 3 is a variant on Example 2, where we keep the replicated receiver b, but
change the identity of one of the senders, so that the two senders represent two di(erent
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principals a and a′. These two principals share a single channel c to the receiver.
Since the identity a of the sender is a parameter of Rcver(a; b; c) rather than being
explicitly communicated, this assembly is unsafe. There is a run in which a′ generates
msg and ack, and sends them to b; b asserts a begin-event labelled 〈a; b;msg〉 and
outputs on ack; then a′ asserts an end-event labelled 〈a′; b;msg〉. This end-event has
no corresponding begin-event so the assembly is unsafe, reNecting the possibility that
the receiver can be mistaken about the identity of the sender.
3. Typing correspondence assertions
3.1. Types and e1ects
Our type and e(ect system is based on the idea of assigning types to names and
e(ects to processes. A type describes what operations are allowed on a name, such
as what messages may be communicated on a channel name. An e(ect describes the
collection of labels of events the process may end while not itself beginning. We
compute e(ects based on the intuition that end-events are accounted for by preceding
begin-events; a begin-event is a credit while an end-event is a debit. According to
this metaphor, the e(ect of a process is an upper bound on the debt a process may
incur. If we can assign a process the empty e(ect, we know all of its end-events are
accounted for by begin-events. Therefore, we know that the process is safe, that is, its
correspondence assertions are true.
An essential ingredient of our typing rules is the idea of attaching a latent e1ect
to each channel type. We allow any process receiving o( a channel to treat the latent
e(ect as a credit towards subsequent end-events. This is sound because we require
any process sending on a channel to treat the latent e(ect as a debit that must be
accounted for by previous begin-events. Latent e(ects are at the heart of our method
for type-checking events begun by one process and ended by another.
The following table describes the syntax of types and e(ects. As in most versions
of the -calculus, we make no lexical distinction between names and variables, ranged
over by a; b; c; x; y; z. An event label, L, is simply a tuple of names. Event labels
identify the events asserted by begin- and end-assertions. An e1ect, e, is a multiset,
that is, an unordered list, of event labels, written as [L1; : : : ; Ln]. A type, T , takes one
of two kinds. The 4rst kind, Name, is the type of pure names, that is, names that only
support equality operations, but cannot be used as channels. We use Name as the type
of names that identify principals, for instance. The second kind, Ch(x1:T1; : : : ; xn:Tn)e, is
a type of a channel communicating n-tuples of names, of types T1, . . . , Tn, with latent
e(ect e. The names x1, . . . , xn are bound; the scope of each xi consists of the types
Ti+1, . . . , Tn, and the latent e(ect e. We identify types up to the consistent renaming
of bound names.
Names, Event Labels, E ects, and Types:
a; b; c; x; y; z names, variables
L ::= 〈x1; : : : ; xn〉 event label: tuple of names
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e ::= [L1; : : : ; Ln] e(ect: multiset of event labels
T ::= type
Name pure name
Ch(x1:T1; : : : ; xn:Tn)e channel with latent e(ect e
For example:
• Ch()[ ], a synchronization channel (that is, a channel used only for synchronization)
with no latent e(ect.
• Ch(a:Name)[〈b〉], a channel for communicating a pure name, costing [〈b〉] to senders
and paying [〈b〉] to receivers, where b is a 4xed name.
• Ch(a:Name)[〈a〉], a channel for communicating a pure name, costing [〈a〉] to senders
and paying [〈a〉] to receivers, where a is the name communicated on the channel.
• Ch(a:Name; b:Ch()[〈a〉])[ ], a channel with no latent e(ect for communicating pairs
of the form a; b, where a is a pure name, and b is the name of a synchronization
channel, costing [〈a〉] to senders and paying [〈a〉] to receivers.
The following is a convenient shorthand for the lists of typed variable declarations
found in channel types:
Notation for Typed Variables:
x˜:T˜ , x1:T1; : : : ; xn:Tn where x˜ = x1; : : : ; xn and T˜ = T1; : : : ; Tn
, () the empty list
The following table de4nes the sets of free names of variable declarations, and of event
labels, e(ects, and types.
Free Names of Typed Variables, Event Labels, E ects, and Types:
fn(:),?
fn(x˜:T˜ ; x:T ), fn(x˜:T˜ ) ∪ (fn(T )− {x˜})
fn(〈x1; : : : ; xn〉) = {x1; : : : ; xn}
fn([L1; : : : ; L1]), fn(L1) ∪ · · · ∪ fn(Ln)
fn(Name),?
fn(Ch(x˜:T˜ )e), fn(x˜:T˜ ) ∪ (fn(e)− {x˜})
For any of these forms of syntax, we write −{x←y} for the operation of capture-
avoiding substitution of the name y for each free occurrence of the name x. We
write −{x˜← y˜}, where x˜= x1; : : : ; xn and y˜=y1; : : : ; yn for the iterated substitution
−{x1←y1} · · · {xn←yn}.
3.2. Syntax of our typed -calculus
The calculus of this paper is an asynchronous, polyadic -calculus, with a conditional
based on name equality. We expect our techniques could be applied to other standard
variations of the -calculus.
We explained the informal semantics of begin- and end-assertions in Section 2, and
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of the other constructs in Section 1.
Processes:
P;Q; R ::= process
out x〈y1; : : : ; yn〉 polyadic asynchronous output
inp x(y1:T1; : : : ; yn:Tn);P polyadic input
if x = y then P else Q conditional
new(x:T );P name generation
P | Q composition
repeat P replication
stop inactivity
begin L;P begin-assertion
end L;P end-assertion
There are two name binding constructs: input and name generation. In an input
process inp x(y1:T1; : : : ; yn:Tn);P, each name yi is bound, with scope consisting of
Ti+1; : : : ; Tn, and P. In a name restriction new(x:T );P, the name x is bound; its scope
is P. We write P{x←y} for the outcome of a capture-avoiding substitution of the
name y for each free occurrence of the name x in the process P. We identify processes
up to the consistent renaming of bound names. We let fn(P) be the set of free names
of a process P. We sometimes write an output as out x〈y˜〉 where y˜=y1; : : : ; yn,
and an input as inp x(y˜:T˜ );P, where y˜:T˜ is a variable declaration written in the
notation introduced in the previous section. We write out x〈y˜〉;P as a shorthand for
out x〈y˜〉 | P.
Free Names of Processes:
fn(out x〈y˜〉), {x} ∪ {y˜}
fn(inp x(y˜:T˜ );P), {x} ∪ fn(y˜:T˜ ) ∪ (fn(P)− {y˜})
fn(if x = y then P else Q), {x; y} ∪ fn(P) ∪ fn(Q)
fn(new(x:T );P), fn(T ) ∪ (fn(P)− {x})
fn(P | Q), fn(P) ∪ fn(Q)
fn(repeat P), fn(P)
fn(stop),?
fn(begin 〈y˜〉;P), {y˜} ∪ fn(P)
fn(end 〈y˜〉;P), {y˜} ∪ fn(P)
3.3. Intuitions for the type and e1ect system
As a prelude to our formal typing rules, we present the underlying intuitions. Recall
the intuition that end-events are costs to be accounted for by begin-events. When we
say a process P has e(ect e, it means that e is an upper bound on the begin-events
needed to precede P to make the whole process safe. In other words, if P has e(ect
[L1; : : : ; Ln] then begin L1; · · · ; begin Ln;P is safe.
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Typing assertions: An assertion begin L;P pays for one end-event labelled L in P;
so if P is a process with e(ect e, then begin L;P is a process with e(ect e− [L], that
is, the multiset e with one occurrence of L deleted. So we have a typing rule of the
form:
P : e ⇒ begin L;P : e − [L]
If P is a process with e(ect e, then end L;P is a process with e(ect e + [L], that
is, the concatenation of e and [L]. We have a rule:
P : e ⇒ end L;P : e + [L]
Typing name generation and concurrency: The e(ect of a name generation process
new(x:T );P, is simply the e(ect of P. To prevent scope confusion, we forbid x from
occurring in this e(ect.
P : e; x =∈ fn(e) ⇒ new(x : T );P : e
The e(ect of a concurrent composition of processes is the multiset union of the
constituent processes.
P : eP; Q : eQ ⇒ P | Q : eP + eQ
The inactive process asserts no end-events, so its e(ect is empty.
stop : []
The replication of a process P behaves like an unbounded array of replicas of P. If
P has a non-empty e(ect, then its replication would have an unbounded e(ect, which
could not be accounted for by preceding begin-assertions. Therefore, to type repeat P
we require P to have an empty e(ect.
P : [] ⇒ repeat P : []
Typing communications: We begin by presenting the rules for typing communica-
tions on monadic channels with no latent e(ect, that is, those with types of the form
Ch(y:T )[ ]. The communicated name has type T . An output out x〈z〉 has empty ef-
fect. An input inp x(y:T );P has the same e(ect as P. Since the input variable in the
process and in the type are both bound, we may assume they are the same variable
y.
x : Ch(y:T )[]; z : T ⇒ out x〈z〉 : []
x : Ch(y:T )[]; P : e; y =∈ fn(e) ⇒ inp x(y:T );P : e
Next, we consider the type Ch(y:T )e‘ of monadic channels with latent e(ect e‘. The
latent e(ect is a cost to senders, a bene4t to receivers, and is the scope of the variable y.
We assign an output out x〈z〉 the e(ect e‘{y← z}, where we have instantiated the
name y bound in the type of the channel with z, the name actually sent on the channel.
We assign an input inp x(y:T );P the e(ect e−e‘, where e is the e(ect of P. To avoid
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scope confusion, we require that y is not free in e − e‘.
x : Ch(y :T )e‘; z : T ⇒ out x〈z〉 : e‘{y ← z}
x : Ch(y :T )e‘; P : e; y =∈ fn(e) ⇒ inp x(y :T );P : e − e‘
The formal rules for input and output in the next section generalize these rules to
deal with polyadic channels.
Typing conditionals: When typing a conditional if x = y then P else Q, it is useful
to exploit the fact that P only runs if the two names x and y are equal. To do so,
we check the e(ect of P after substituting one for the other. Suppose then process
P{x←y} has e(ect eP{x←y}. Suppose also that process Q has e(ect eQ. Let eP ∨eQ
be the least upper bound of any two e(ects eP and eQ. Then eP∨eQ is an upper bound
on the begin-events needed to precede the conditional to make it safe, whether P or
Q runs. An example in Section 4.2 illustrates this rule.
P{x ← y} : eP{x ← y}; Q : eQ ⇒ if x = y then P else Q : eP ∨ eQ
3.4. Typing rules
Our typing rules depend on several operations on e(ect multisets, most of which
were introduced informally in the previous section. Here are the formal de4nitions.
Operations on e ects: e + e′, e6 e′, e − e′, L∈ e, e ∨ e′
[L1; : : : ; Lm] + [Lm+1; : : : ; Lm+n], [L1; : : : ; Lm+n]
e6 e′ if and only if e′ = e + e′′ for some e′′
e − e′ , the smallest e′′ such that e6 e′ + e′′
L ∈ e if and only if [L]6 e
e ∨ e′ , the smallest e′′ such that e6 e′′ and e′ 6 e′′
The typing judgments of this section depend on an environment to assign a type to all
the variables in scope. Our typing rules ensure that the names listed in an environment
are always pairwise distinct.
Environments:
E ::= x˜:T˜ environment
dom(x˜:T˜ ), {x˜} domain of an environment
To equate two names in an environment, needed for typing conditionals, we de-
4ne a name fusion function. We obtain the fusion E{x← x′} from E by turning all
occurrences of x and x′ in E into x′.
Fusing x with x′ in E: E{x← x′}
(x1:T1; : : : ; xn:Tn){x← x′},
(x1{x← x′}):(T1{x← x′}); : : : ; (xn{x← x′}):(Tn{x← x′})
where E; x:T ,
{
E if x ∈ dom(E)
E; x:T otherwise
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The following table summarizes the 4ve judgments of our type system, which are
inductively de4ned by rules in subsequent tables. Judgment E   means environment
E is well formed. Judgment E  T means type T is well formed. Judgment E  x : T
means name x is in scope with type T . Judgment E  〈x˜〉:〈y˜:T˜ 〉 means tuple 〈x˜〉 matches
the variable declaration y˜:T˜ . Judgment E P : e means process P has e(ect e.
Judgments:
E   good environment
E  T good type T
E  x : T good name x of type T
E  〈x˜〉:〈y˜:T˜ 〉 good message x˜ matching y˜:T˜
E  P : e good process P with e(ect e
The rules de4ning the 4rst three judgments are standard. The names listed in a good
environment, or in a channel type, are guaranteed to include no duplicates, that is, if
E   where E= x˜:T˜ , or if E′ Ch(x˜:T˜ )e, then the list x˜ includes no duplicates.
Good environments, types, and names:
(Env ?)
?  
(Env x)
E  T x =∈ dom(E)
E; x:T  
(Type Name)
E  
E  Name
(Type Chan)
E; x˜:T˜   fn(e) ⊆ dom(E) ∪ {x˜}
E  Ch(x˜:T˜ )e
(Name x)
E′; x:T; E′′  
E′; x:T; E′′  x : T
The next judgment, E  〈x˜〉:〈y˜:T˜ 〉, is an auxiliary judgment used for typing output
processes; it is used in the rule (Proc Output) to check that the message 〈x˜〉 sent on
a channel of type Ch(y˜:T˜ )e matches the variable declaration y˜:T˜ .
Good message:
(Msg 〈〉)
E  
E  〈〉 : 〈〉
(Msg x) (where y =∈ {y˜} ∪ dom(E))
E  〈x˜〉 : 〈y˜:T˜ 〉 E  x : (T{y˜← x˜})
E  〈x˜; x〉 : 〈y˜:T˜ ; y:T 〉
Finally, here are the rules for typing processes. The e(ect of a process is an upper
bound; the rule (Proc Subsum) allows us to increase this upper bound. Intuitions for
all the other rules were explained in the previous section.
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Good processes:
(Proc Subsum) (where e6e′ and fn(e′) ⊆ dom(E))
E  P : e
E  P : e′
(Proc Output)
E  x : Ch(y˜:T˜ )e E  〈x˜〉 : 〈y˜:T˜ 〉
E  out x〈x˜〉 : (e{y˜← x˜})
(Proc Input) (where fn(e − e′) ⊆ dom(E))
E  x : Ch(y˜:T˜ )e′ E; y˜:T˜  P : e
E  inp x(y˜:T˜ );P : e − e′
(Proc Cond)
E  x : T E  y : T E{x←y}  P{x←y} : eP{x←y} E  Q : eQ
E  if x = y then P else Q : eP ∨ eQ
(Proc Res) (where x =∈ fn(e))
E; x:T  P : e
E  new(x:T );P : e
(Proc Par)
E  P : eP E  Q : eQ
E  P | Q : eP + eQ
(Proc Repeat)
E  P : [ ]
E  repeat P : [ ]
(Proc Stop)
E  
E  stop : [ ]
(Proc Begin) (where fn(L) ⊆ dom(E))
E  P : e
E  begin L;P : e − [L]
(Proc End) (where fn(L) ⊆ dom(E))
E  P : e
E  end L;P : e + [L]
Section 5 presents our main type safety result, Theorem 2, that E P : [ ] implies
P is safe. Like most type systems, ours is incomplete. There are safe processes that
are not typeable in our system. For example, we cannot assign the process if x =
x then stop else (end x; stop) the empty e(ect, and yet it is perfectly
safe.
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4. Applications
In this section, we present some examples of using correspondence assertions to
validate safety properties of communication protocols. For more examples, including
examples with cryptographic protocols which are secure against external attackers, see
the companion paper [9].
In these examples, we write out x〈y˜〉;P as a shorthand for out x〈y˜〉 | P.
4.1. Transmit-acknowledge handshake
Recall the untyped sender and receiver code from Section 2. Suppose we make the
type de4nitions:
Msg , Name Ack(a; b;msg) , Ch()[〈a; b;msg〉]
Host , Name Req(a; b) , Ch(msg:Msg; ack:Ack(a; b;msg))[ ]
Suppose also that we annotate the sender and receiver code, and the code of Example 1
as follows:
Snder(a:Host; b:Host; c:Req(a; b)),
new(msg:Msg);
new(ack:Ack(a; b;msg));
out c〈msg; ack〉;
inp ack();
end 〈a; b;msg〉
Rcver(a:Host; b:Host; c:Req(a; b)),
inp c(msg:Msg; ack:Ack(a; b;msg));
begin 〈a; b;msg〉;
out ack〈〉
Example1(a:Host; b:Host),
new(c:Req(a; b));
Snder(a; b; c) |
Rcver(a; b; c)
We can then check that a:Host; b:Host Example1(a; b) : [ ]. Since the system has the
empty e(ect, by Theorem 2 it is safe. It is routine to check that Example 2 from
Section 2 also has the empty e(ect, but that Example 3 cannot be type checked (as to
be expected, since it is unsafe).
4.2. Hostname lookup
In this example, we present a simple hostname lookup system, where a client b
wishing to ping a server a can contact a name server query, to get a network address
ping for a. The client can then send a ping request to the address ping, and get an
acknowledgement from the server. We shall check two properties:
• When the ping client b 4nishes, it believes that the ping server a has been pinged.
• When the ping server a 4nishes, it believes that it was contacted by the ping client b.
We write ‘a was pinged by b” as shorthand for 〈a; b〉, and “b tried to ping a”
for 〈b; a; a〉. (Our subsequent work [9] di(erentiates event labels via tag primitives
rather than via ad hoc encodings.) These examples are well-typed, with types (such as
Hostname and Query) which we de4ne later in this section.
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Our whole system is as follows. Let h1; : : : ; hn be the names of n principals, and
let ping1; : : : ; pingn be channels on which each principal maintains a ping server. The
name server listens for requests on the query channel. We model the whole system,
including an attempt by host hj to ping host hi as follows:
System(query; h1; : : : ; hn; ping1; : : : ; pingn; i; j),
NameServer(query; h1; : : : ; hn; ping1; : : : ; pingn) |
PingServer(h1; ping1) | · · · | PingServer(hn; pingn) |
PingClient(hi; hj)
Here are the de4nitions of the ping client and server:
PingClient(a:Hostname; b:Hostname; query:Query),
new(res : Res(a));
out query〈a; res〉;
inp res(ping : Ping(a));
new(ack : Ack(a; b));
begin “b tried to ping a”;
out ping〈b; ack〉;
inp ack();
end “a was pinged by b”
PingServer(a : Hostname; ping : Ping(a)),
repeat
inp ping(b : Hostname; ack : Ack(a; b));
begin “a was pinged by b”;
end “b tried to ping a”;
out ack〈〉
If these processes are safe, then any ping request and response must come as matching
pairs. In practice, the name server would require some data structure such as a hash
table or database, but for this simple example we just use a large if-statement:
NameServer(
query:Query;
h1:Hostname; : : : ; hn:Hostname;
ping1:Ping(h1); : : : ; pingn:Ping(hn)
),
repeat
inp query(h; res);
if h = h1 then out res〈ping1〉 else · · ·
if h = hn then out res〈pingn〉 else stop
To get the system to type-check, we use the following types:
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Hostname , Name
Ack(a; b) , Ch()[“a was pinged by b”]
Ping(a) , Ch(b:Hostname; ack:Ack(a; b))[“b tried to ping a”]
Res(a) , Ch(ping:Ping(a))[ ]
Query , Ch(a:Hostname; res:Res(a))[ ]
The most subtle part of type-checking the system is the conditional in the name server.
A typical branch is:
hi : Hostname; pingi : Ping(hi); h : Hostname; res : Res(h)
 if h = hi then out res〈pingi〉 else · · · : [ ]
When type-checking the then-branch, (Proc Cond) assumes h= hi by applying a sub-
stitution to the environment:
(hi : Hostname; pingi : Ping(hi); h : Hostname; res : Res(h)){h← hi}
= (hi : Hostname; pingi : Ping(hi); res : Res(hi))
In this environment, we can type-check the then-branch:
hi : Hostname; pingi : Ping(hi); res : Res(hi)
 out res〈pingi〉 : [ ]
If (Proc Cond) did not apply the substitution to the environment, this example could
not be type-checked, since:
hi : Hostname; pingi : Ping(hi); h : Hostname; res : Res(h)
0 out res〈pingi〉 : [ ]
Overall, we can derive the following judgment, provided i; j∈ 1::n, to show that the
whole system is safe:
query:Query; h1:Hostname; : : : ; ping1:Ping(h1); : : : 
System(query; h1; : : : ; hn; ping1; : : : ; pingn; i; j) : [ ]
4.3. Functions
It is typical to code the -calculus into the -calculus, using a return channel k as the
destination for the result. For instance, the hostname lookup example of the previous
section can be rewritten in the style of a remote procedure call. The client and server
are now:
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PingClient(a:Hostname; b:Hostname; query:Query),
let (ping : Ping(a)) = query 〈a〉;
begin “b tried to ping a”;
let () = ping 〈b〉;
end “a was pinged by b”
PingServer(a : Hostname; ping : Ping(a)),
fun ping(b:Hostname) {
begin “a was pinged by b”;
end “b tried to ping a”;
return 〈〉
}
The name server is now:
NameServer(
query:Query;
h1:Hostname; : : : ; hn:Hostname;
ping1:Ping(h1); : : : ; pingn:Ping(hn)
),
fun query(h:Hostname) {
if h = h1 then return 〈ping1〉 else · · ·
if h = hn then return 〈pingn〉 else stop
}
In order to provide types for these examples, we have to provide a function type with
latent e1ects. These e(ects are precondition=postcondition pairs, which act like Hoare
triples. In the type (x˜:T˜ )e → (y˜:U˜ )e′ we have a precondition e which the callee must
satisfy, and a postcondition e′ which the caller must satisfy. For example, the types
for the hostname lookup example are:
Ping(a) , (b:Hostname)[“b tried to ping a”]→ ()[“a was pinged by b”]
Query , (a:Hostname)[ ]→ (ping:Ping(a))[ ]
which speci4es that the remote ping call has a precondition “b tried to ping a” and a
postcondition “a was pinged by b”.
This can be coded into the -calculus using a translation [21] in continuation passing
style. We assume that the type of each function is declared in advance.
fun f(x˜:T˜ ) {P} , repeat inp f(x˜:T˜ ; k:Ch(y˜:U˜ )e′);P
where f : (x˜:T˜ )e → (y˜:U˜ )e′
let (y˜:U˜ ) = f 〈x˜〉;P , new(k:Ch(y˜:U˜ )e′); out f〈x˜; k〉; inp k(y˜:U˜ );P
return 〈˜z〉 , out k 〈˜z〉
(x˜:T˜ )e → (y˜:U˜ )e′ , Ch(x˜:T˜ ; k:Ch(y˜:U˜ )e′)e
This translation is standard, except for the typing. It is routine to verify its soundness.
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5. Formalizing correspondence assertions
In this section, we give the formal de4nition of the trace semantics for the -calculus
with correspondence assertions, which is used in the de4nition of a safe process. We
then state the main result of this paper, which is that e(ect-free processes are safe.
We give the trace semantics as a labelled transition system. Following Berry and
Boudol [3] and Milner [21] we use a structural congruence P≡Q, and give our oper-
ational semantics up to ≡.
Structural Congruence: P ≡ Q
P ≡ P (Struct ReN)
Q ≡ P ⇒ P ≡ Q (Struct Symm)
P ≡ Q;Q ≡ R⇒ P ≡ R (Struct Trans)
P ≡ P′ ⇒ inp x(y˜:T˜ );P ≡ inp x(y˜:T˜ );P′ (Struct Input)
P ≡ P′; Q ≡ Q′ ⇒
if x = y then P else Q ≡
if x = y then P′ else Q′
(Struct If)
P ≡ P′ ⇒ new(x:T );P ≡ new(x:T );P′ (Struct Res)
P ≡ P′ ⇒ P | R ≡ P′ | R (Struct Par)
P ≡ P′ ⇒ repeat P ≡ repeat P′ (Struct Repl)
P ≡ P′ ⇒ begin L;P ≡ begin L;P′ (Struct Begin)
P ≡ P′ ⇒ end L;P ≡ end L;P′ (Struct End)
P | stop ≡ P (Struct Par Zero)
P | Q ≡ Q | P (Struct Par Comm)
(P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R) (Struct Par Assoc)
repeat P ≡ P | repeat P (Struct Repl Par)
new(x:T ); (P | Q) ≡ P | new(x:T );Q (Struct Res Par) (where x =∈ fn(P))
new(x1:T1); new(x2:T2);P ≡
new(x2:T2); new(x1:T1);P
(Struct Res Res)
(where x1 = x2; x1 =∈ fn(T2); x2 =∈ fn(T1))
There are four actions in this labelled transition system:
• P begin L−→ P′ when P reaches a begin L assertion.
• P end L−→ P′ when P reaches an end L assertion.
• P gen 〈x〉−→ P′ when P generates a new name x.
• P "→P′ when P can perform an internal action.
For example:
(new(x:Name); begin 〈x〉; end 〈x〉; stop) gen 〈x〉−→ (begin 〈x〉; end 〈x〉; stop)
begin 〈x〉−→ (end 〈x〉; stop)
end 〈x〉−→ (stop)
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Next, we give the syntax of actions #, and their free and generated names.
Actions:
#; $ ::= actions
begin L begin-event
end L end-event
gen 〈x〉 name generation
" internal
Free names, fn(#), and generated names, gn(#), of an action #:
fn(") , ? gn(") , ?
fn(begin L) , fn(L) gn(begin L) , ?
fn(end L) , fn(L) gn(end L) , ?
fn(gen 〈x〉) , {x} gn(gen 〈x〉 , {x}
The labelled transition system P #→P′ is de4ned here.
Transitions: P #→P′
out x〈x˜〉 | inp x(y˜);P "→P{y˜← x˜} (Trans Comm)
if x = x then P else Q "→P (Trans Match)
if x = y then P else Q "→Q (Trans Mismatch) (if x = y)
begin L;P
begin L−→ P (Trans Begin)
end L;P end L−→ P (Trans End)
new(x:T );P
gen 〈x〉−→ P (Trans Gen)
P #→P′ ⇒ P | Q #→P′ | Q (Trans Par) (if gn(#) ∩ fn(Q) =?)
P ≡ P′; P′ #→Q′; Q′ ≡ Q ⇒ P #→Q (Trans ≡)
From this operational semantics, we can de4ne the traces of a process, with reduc-
tions P s→P′ where s is a sequence of actions.
Traces:
s; t ::= #1; : : : ; #n trace
Free names, fn(s), and generated names, gn(s), of a trace s:
fn(#1; : : : ; #n) , fn(#1) ∪ · · · ∪ fn(#n)
gn(#1; : : : ; #n) , gn(#1) ∪ · · · ∪ gn(#n)
Traced transitions: P s→P′
P ≡ P′ ⇒ P ”−→P′ (Trace ≡)
P #→P′′; P′′ s→P′ ⇒ P #;s→P′ (Trace Action) (where fn(#) ∩ gn(s) =?)
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We require a side-condition on (Trace Action) to ensure that generated names are
unique, otherwise we could observe traces such as
(new(x); new(y); stop)
gen 〈x〉;gen 〈x〉−→ (stop)
Having formally de4ned the trace semantics of our -calculus, we can de4ne when a
trace is a correspondence: this is when every end L has a distinct, matching begin L.
For example:
begin L; end L is a correspondence
begin L; end L; end L is not a correspondence
begin L; begin L; end L; end L is a correspondence
We formalize this by counting the number of begin L and end L actions there are in
a trace.
Beginnings, begins(#), and endings, ends(#), of an action #:
begins(begin L) , [L] ends(begin L) , [ ]
begins(end L) , [ ] ends(end L) , [L]
begins(gen 〈x〉) , [ ] ends(gen 〈x〉) , [ ]
begins(") , [ ] ends(") , [ ]
Beginnings, begins(s), and endings, ends(s), of a trace s:
begins(#1; : : : ; #n) , begins(#1) + · · ·+ begins(#n)
ends(#1; : : : ; #n) , ends(#1) + · · ·+ ends(#n)
Correspondence:
A trace s is a correspondence if and only if ends(s)6 begins(s).
A process is safe if every trace is a correspondence.
Safety:
A process P is safe if and only if for all traces s and processes P′
if P s→P′ then s is a correspondence.
A subtlety of this de4nition of safety is that although we want each end-event of a
safe process to be preceded by a distinct, matching begin-event, a trace st may be a
correspondence by virtue of a later begin-event in t matching an earlier end-event in
s. For example, a trace like end L; begin L is a correspondence.
To see why our de4nition implies that a matching begin-event must precede each
end-event in each trace of a safe process, suppose a safe process has a trace s; endL; t.
By de4nition of traces, the process also has the shorter trace s; end L, which must be
a correspondence, since it is a trace of a safe process. Therefore, the end-event end L
is preceded by a matching begin-event in s.
A.D. Gordon, A. Je1rey / Theoretical Computer Science 300 (2003) 379–409 397
We can now state the formal result of the paper, Theorem 2, that every e(ect-
free process is safe. This gives us a compositional technique for verifying the safety
of communications protocols. It follows from a subject reduction result, Theorem 2.
The most diScult parts of the formal development to check in detail are the parts
associated with the (Proc Cond) rule, because of its use of a substitution applied to an
environment. Proofs are in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 (Subject reduction). Suppose E P:e.
(1) If P "→P′ then E P′ : e.
(2) If P
begin L−→ P′ then E P′ : e + [L].
(3) If P end L−→ P′ then E P′ : e − [L], and L∈ e.
(4) If P
gen 〈x〉−→ P′ and x =∈ dom(E) then E; x:T P′ : e for some type T .
Theorem 2 (Safety). If E P : [ ] then P is safe.
6. Related work
Correspondence assertions are not new; we have already discussed prior work on
correspondence assertions for cryptographic protocols [30,20]. A contribution of our
work is the idea of directly expressing correspondence assertions by adding annotations
to a general concurrent language, in our case the -calculus.
Gi(ord and Lucassen introduced type and e(ect systems [12,19] to manage side-
e(ects in functional programming. There is a substantial literature. Early work on
concurrent languages includes systems by Nielson and Nielson [23,22] and Talpin [28].
Recent applications of type and e(ect systems include memory management for high-
[29] and low-level [6] languages, race-condition avoidance [8], and access control [26].
Milner’s system of sorts [21], the 4rst type system for the -calculus, regulates
the data sent on channels. Pierce and Sangiorgi [25] propose a re4nement based on
subtyping channel types. Our type system omits subtyping, for the sake of simplicity,
but we expect it would be a straightforward addition.
Later type systems for the -calculus also regulate process behaviour; for example,
session types [27,14] regulate pairwise interactions and linear types [17] help avoid
deadlocks. A recent paper [7] explicitly proposes a type and e(ect system for the
-calculus, and the idea of latent e(ects on channel types. This idea can also be
represented in a recent general framework for concurrent type systems [16]. Still, the
types of our system are dependent in the sense that they may include the names of
channels. Another system of dependent types for a concurrent language is Flanagan
and Abadi’s system [8] for avoiding race conditions in the concurrent object calculus
of Gordon and Hankin. Technique of Chaki et al. [4] for model-checking -calculus
programs is inNuenced, in part, by the use of dependent types in the present work.
The rule (Proc Cond) for typing a conditional if x = y then P else Q checks
the positive branch P under the assumption that the names x and y are the same; we
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formalize this by substituting y for x in the type environment and the process P. Given
that names are the only kind of value, this technique is simpler than the standard one
from dependent type theory [24,2] of de4ning typing judgments with respect to an
equivalence relation on values. Honda et al. [15] also use the technique of applying
substitutions to environments while type-checking.
In their study of a distributed -calculus, Hennessy and Riely [13] propose an alter-
native technique for exploiting the name equality x=y when type-checking the positive
branch of such a conditional. Their rule relies on computing intersection types in the
presence of a subtype relation. In an environment where x:T and y:U , they check
the positive branch P of a conditional under the additional assumptions x:U and y:T ,
hence e(ectively assigning to both x and y the intersection of the types T and U .
7. Conclusions
The long-term objective of this work is to check secrecy and authenticity proper-
ties of security protocols by typing. This paper introduces several key ideas in the
minimal yet general setting of the -calculus: the idea of expressing correspondences
by begin- and end-annotations, the idea of a dependent type and e(ect system for
proving correspondences, and the idea of using latent e(ects to type correspondences
begun by one process and ended by another. Several examples demonstrate the promise
of this system. Unlike a previous approach based on model-checking, type-checking
correspondence assertions is not limited to 4nite-state systems.
A companion paper [9] begins the work of applying these ideas to cryptographic
protocols as formalized in Abadi and Gordon’s spi-calculus [1], and has already proved
useful in identifying known issues in published protocols. Our 4rst type system for spi
is speci4c to cryptographic protocols based on symmetric key cryptography. Instead of
attaching latent e(ects to channel types, as in this paper, we attach them to a new type
for nonces, to formalize a speci4c idiom for preventing replay attacks. A subsequent
paper extends our type system to cope with asymmetric cryptography [11]. One avenue
for future work is type inference algorithms.
The type system of the present paper has independent interest. It introduces the ideas
in a more general setting than the spi-calculus, and shows in principle that correspon-
dence assertions can be type-checked in any of the many programming languages that
may be reduced to the -calculus.
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Appendix A. Proofs
This appendix develops proofs of the two theorems stated in the main body of
the paper. We begin in Section A.1 with some basic facts about the type system.
Section A.2 proves properties of the unusual operation—found in the rule (Proc Cond)
for typing conditionals—of applying a substitution to an environment. Section A.3
proves standard weakening, exchange, and substitution lemmas for the type system.
Finally, Section A.4 proves Theorems 1 and 2.
A.1. Basic facts
We use the notation E J to refer to any judgment of the system. So J ranges
over fragments of the form ; x:T; 〈x˜〉:〈y˜:T˜ 〉, or P : e.
Free names, fn(J) of a judgment fragment J:
fn(),?
fn(x:T ), {x} ∪ fn(T )
fn(〈x˜〉:〈y˜:T˜ 〉), {x˜} ∪ fn(〈y˜:T˜ 〉)
fn(P : e), fn(P) ∪ fn(e)
Lemma A.1 (Free names). If E J then fn(J) ⊆ dom(E).
Proof. We prove by induction the more general result that if E J then fn(J) ⊆
dom(E) and that if E; x : T; E′   then fn(T ) ⊆ dom(E).
Lemma A.2 (Implied judgement). If E; E′ J then E  .
Proof. An induction on the proof of E; E′ J.
Lemma A.3 (Variable typing). If E  x : T then E=E′; x : T; E′′.
Proof. An analysis of the proof of E  x : T .
Lemma A.4 (Unique types). If E  x : T and E  x : T ′ then T =T ′.
Proof. An analysis of the proof of E  x : T .
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A.2. Applying substitutions to environments
Recall the de4nition from Section 3.4 of the auxiliary notation E; x:T used in the
de4nition of applying a substitution to an environment. It adds a singleton list x:T to
E provided x is not already declared in E. As a convenience, we extend this notation
to arbitrary lists.
Environment addition: E;E′
E;E′ , E; (E′ − dom(E))
This de4nition makes use of an operator to delete entries from an environment.
Deletion of Names Y from Environment E: E − Y
?− Y ,?
(E; x:T )− Y ,
{
E − Y if x ∈ Y
(E − Y ); x:T otherwise
Lemma A.5. Environment addition is associative, that is E; (E′;E′′)= (E;E′);E′′.
Proof. First show the following equivalences:
dom(E − Y ) = dom(E)− Y; dom(E; E′) = dom(E) ∪ dom(E′)
(E; E′)− Y = (E − Y ); (E′ − Y ) E − (Y ∪ Y ′) = (E − Y )− Y ′
The result then follows directly.
We recall the de4nition of applying a substitution to an environment.
Fusing x with x′ in E: E{x← x′}
(x1:T1; : : : ; xn:Tn){x← x′},
(x1{x← x′}):(T1{x← x′}); : : : ; (xn{x← x′}):(Tn{x← x′})
For example, (x:T; x′:T ){x← x′}= x′:T . Notice that applying a substitution to an en-
vironment that contains multiple declarations of the same variable deletes duplicate
entries: (x:T; x:T ){x← x′}= x′:T .
The following equation is useful for analysing the outcome of applying a substitution
to the well-formed concatenation of two environments.
Lemma A.6. (E; E′){y←y′}=(E{y←y′}); (E′{y←y′}).
Proof. An induction on E′. The base case, when E′ =?, is trivial. For the inductive
step, suppose that E′ =(E′′; x:T ). Then, by induction and Lemma A.5:
(E; E′){y ← y′}= (E; E′′; x : T ){y ← y′}
= (E; E′′){y ← y′}; (x{y ← y′} : T{y ← y′})
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= (E{y ← y′}); (E′′{y ← y′}); (x{y ← y′} : T{y ← y′})
= (E{y ← y′}); ((E′′; x : T ){y ← y′})
= (E{y ← y′}); (E′{y ← y′})
as required.
We end this section by showing that all judgments of the type system are pre-
served by substituting one variable for another, provided the types of the variables are
compatible.
Variable compatibility:
Let x and y be E-compatible if and only if {x; y} ⊆ dom(E) implies
there is T such that both E  x:T and E y:T .
Lemma A.7 (Fusion). If y and y′ are E-compatible and E J then E{y←y′} J{y
←y′}.
Proof. By induction on the proof of E J.
(Env x)
E  T x =∈ dom(E)
E; x:T  
By de4nition, since y and y′ are (E; x:T )-compatible, they are also E-compa-
tible. By induction hypothesis, this and E T imply E{y←y′} T
{y←y′}.
Case: x{y←y′}∈ dom(E{y←y′}). By Lemma A.2 E{y←y′}  . By de4nition,
(E; x:T ){y←y′}=E{y←y′}, and so we have (E; x:T ){y←y′}  .
Case: x{y←y′} =∈ dom(E{y←y′}). Since we have E{y←y′} T{y←y′} and
x{y←y′} =∈ dom(E{y←y′}) we can apply Rule (Env x) to get the required result:
(E; x:T ){y←y′}  .
(Type Chan)
E; x1:T1; : : : ; xn:Tn   fn(e) ⊆ dom(E) ∪ {x˜}
E Ch(x1:T1; : : : ; xn:Tn)e
Since the names x1, . . . , xn are bound, we may assume that {y; y′} ∩
{x1; : : : ; xn}=?. By de4nition, since y and y′ are E-compatible and
{y; y′}∩{x1; : : : ; xn}=? it follows that y and y′ are (E; x1:T1; : : : ; xn:Tn)-
compatible. By induction hypothesis, this and E; x1:T1; : : : ; xn:Tn   imply
(E; x1:T1; : : : ; xn:Tn){y←y′}  . From fn(e) ⊆ dom(E) ∪ {x˜} it follows
that fn(e{y←y′}) ⊆ dom(E{y←y′})∪ {x˜}. By (Type Chan), this and
E{y←y′}; x1:T1{y←y′}; : : : ; xn:Tn{y←y′}   imply
E{y ← y′}  Ch(x1 :T1{y ← y′}; : : : ; xn :Tn{y ← y′})(e{y ← y′});
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that is, E{y←y′}  (Ch(x1:T1; : : : ; xn:Tn)e){y←y′}.
(Name x)
E′; x:T; E′′  
E′; x:T; E′′  x : T
We have two cases:
Case: x=y or x=y′. By induction hypothesis, we get:
E′{y ← y′};y′:T{y ← y′};E′′{y ← y′}  
We consider two subcases. First, y′ ∈ dom(E′{y←y′}). Since y and
y′ are (E′; x:T; E′′)-compatible, we have that y′:T{y←y′}∈E′{y←y′}
and so we get:
E′{y ← y′};y′:T{y ← y′};E′′{y ← y′}  y′ : T{y ← y′}
Second, y′ =∈ dom(E′{y←y′}). Directly, we have:
E′{y ← y′};y′ :T{y ← y′};E′′{y ← y′}  y′ : T{y ← y′}
Case: x =y and x =y′. By induction hypothesis, we get:
E′{y ← y′}; x :T{y ← y′};E′′{y ← y′}  
Hence, E′{y←y′}; x:T{y←y′};E′′{y←y′}  x : T{y←y′} as req-
uired.
The arguments for the other rules are similar.
A.3. Weakening, exchange, substitution
We prove three standard properties of the type system.
Lemma A.8 (Weakening). If E; E′ J; E T and x =∈ dom(E; E′) then E; x:T; E′ J.
Proof. An induction on the proof of E; E′ J.
(Proc Cond)
E; E′  y : U E; E′  y′ : U
(E; E′){y←y′}  P{y←y′} : eP{y←y′} E; E′  Q : eQ
E; E′  if y = y′ then P else Q : eP ∨ eQ
De4ne:
D = E{y ← y′} D′ = E′{y ← y′} − dom(D) S = T{y ← y′}
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Then since x =∈ dom(E; E′) we can use Lemma A.6 to get that:
(E; E′){y ← y′} = (D;D′) (E; x :T; E′){y ← y′} = (D; x :S; D′)
By Lemma A.7 we have that D S. By Lemma A.1 we have that
y∈ dom(E; E′), hence y′ = x, and therefore x =∈ dom(D;D′). So we
can use induction to get:
E; x :T; E′  y : U
E; x :T; E′  y′ : U
E; x :T; E′  Q : eQ
D; x :S; D′  P{y ← y′} : eP{y ← y′}
and then, by Rule (Proc Cond) we have:
E; x :T; E′  if y = y′ then P else Q : eP ∨ eQ
as required.
The arguments for the other rules are standard.
Lemma A.9 (Exchange). If E; x:T; x′:T ′; E′ J and E T ′ then E; x′:T ′; x:T; E′ J.
Proof. By induction on the proof of E; x:T; x′:T ′; E′ J.
(Proc Cond)
E; x:T; x′:T ′; E′  y : U E; x:T; x′:T ′; E′  y′ : U
(E; x:T; x′:T ′; E′){y ← y′}  P{y ← y′} : eP{y ← y′}
E; x:T; x′:T ′; E′  Q : eQ
E; x:T; x′:T ′; E′  if y = y′ then P else Q : eP ∨ eQ
De4ne:
D = E{y ← y′} D′ = E′{y ← y′} − dom(D; z :S; z′ :S ′)
z = x{y ← y′} z′ = x′{y ← y′}
S = T{y ← y′} S ′ = T ′{y ← y′}
Then we can use Lemma A.6 to get that:
(E; x : T; x′ : T ′; E′){y ← y′} = (D; z : S; z′ : S ′); D′
(E; x′ : T ′; x : T; E′){y ← y′} = (D; z′ : S ′; z : S); D′
and we can use induction to get:
E; x′ :T ′; x :T; E′  y : U
E; x′ :T ′; x :T; E′  y′ : U
E; x′ :T ′; x :T; E′  Q : eQ
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and Lemma A.7 to get:
D  S ′
We have that:
(D; z :S; z′ :S ′); D′  P{y ← y′} : eP{y ← y′}
If we can show that:
(D; z′ :S ′; z :S); D′  P{y ← y′} : eP{y ← y′}
then we can use Rule (Proc Cond) to complete. We consider three cases:
(1) z ∈ dom(D) or z′ ∈ dom(D): In this case, we have that D; z:S; z′:S ′ =D; z′:S ′; z:S,
so the result is immediate.
(2) z= z′ =∈ dom(D): This can only happen when x=y and x′ =y′, or when x=y′
and x′ =y. In either case, by the hypothesis of Rule (Proc Cond), and the fact
that z; z′ =∈ dom(D), so x; x′ =∈ dom(E), we have that T =T ′ =U , and so S = S ′.
Thus, D; z:S; z′:S ′ =D; z′:S ′; z:S, so the result is immediate.
(3) z; z′ =∈ dom(D) and z = z′: So (D; z:S; z′:S ′)= (D; z:S; z′:S ′) and (D; z′:S ′; z:S)=
(D; z′:S ′; z:S), so we can use induction to get the required result.
The arguments for the other rules are standard.
Lemma A.10 (Substitution). If E; y˜:T˜ ; E′ J and E  〈x˜〉:〈y˜:T˜ 〉 then we have E; (E′
{y˜ ← x˜}) (J{y˜ ← x˜}).
Proof. First show the result in the case where x˜ and y˜ are of length 1, by appeal to
Lemma A.7 (Fusion). The result then follows by induction on the length of x˜ and y˜.
A.4. Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
This 4nal appendix contains proofs of the two theorems stated in the main body of
the paper: subject reduction, Theorem 1, and safety, Theorem 2.
We begin the development with two technical lemmas.
Lemma A.11 (Subsumption elimination). If E P:e then for some e′6e, E P : e′ is
derivable without using the rule (Proc Subsum). Moreover, e′ is the minimum e1ect
for P in E, that is, for all e′′, if E P : e′′ then e′6e′′.
Proof. An induction on the proof of E P : e.
Lemma A.12 (≡ elimination). If P #→P′ then for some Q ≡ P and Q′ ≡ P′; Q #→Q′
is derivable without using the rule (Trans ≡).
Proof. An induction on the derivation of P #→P′.
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Next, we show that structural congruence preserves typings.
Proposition A.1 (Subject congruence). If E P : e and P ≡ Q then E Q : e.
Proof. Prove by induction on the derivation of ≡ that if P ≡ Q then:
(1) If E P : e then E Q : e.
(2) If E Q : e then E P : e.
This induction uses Lemmas A.8 (Weakening), A.1 (Free Names), A.9 (Exchange),
and A.11 (Subsumption Elimination).
We can now prove subject reduction.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose E P:e.
(1) If P "→P′ then E P′ : e.
(2) If P
begin 〈x˜〉−→ P′ then E P′ : e + [〈x˜〉].
(3) If P
end 〈x˜〉−→ P′ then E P′ : e − [〈x˜〉], and 〈x˜〉 ∈ e.
(4) If P
gen 〈x〉−→ P′ and x =∈ dom(E) then E; x:T P′ : e for some type T .
Proof.
(1) If P "→P′ derives from (Trans Comm) then by Lemma A.12 (≡ Elimination):
P ≡ out x〈x˜ | inp x(y˜ :T˜ );Q | R P′ ≡ Q{y˜ ← x˜} | R
so by Proposition A.1 (Subject Congruence), Lemma A.11 (Subsumption Elimi-
nation) and the type rules (Proc Par), (Proc Input) and (Proc Output), we have:
E  x : Ch(y˜ : T˜ )eC E  〈x˜〉 : 〈y˜ : T˜ 〉
E; y˜ :T˜  Q : eQ E  R : eR
(eC{y˜ ← x˜}+ (eQ − eC) + eR)6 e fn(eQ − eC) ⊆ dom(E)
then by Lemma A.10 (Substitution) and type rule (Proc Par) we have:
E  (Q{y˜ ← x˜} | R) : (eQ{y˜ ← x˜}+ eR)
so some multiset algebra and the condition that fn(eQ − eC) ⊆ dom(E) gives:
(eQ{y˜ ← x˜}+ eR)6 ((eC + (eQ − eC)){y˜ ← x˜}+ eR)
= (eC{y˜ ← x˜}+ ((eQ − eC){y˜ ← x˜}) + eR)
= (eC{y˜ ← x˜}+ (eQ − eC) + eR)
6 e
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so by type rule (Proc Subsum) and Proposition A.1 (Subject Congruence):
E  P′ : e
as required.
The cases when P "→P′ derives from (Trans Match) or (Trans Mismatch) are
similar.
(2) If P
begin 〈x˜〉−→ P′ then by Lemma A.12 (≡ Elimination):
P ≡ begin〈x˜〉;Q | R P′ ≡ Q | R
so by Proposition A.1 (Subject Congruence), Lemma A.11 (Subsumption Elimi-
nation) and the type rules (Proc Par) and (Proc Begin), we have:
E  Q : eQ E  R : eR
{x˜} ⊆ dom(E) ((eQ − [〈x˜〉]) + eR)6 e
so by (Proc Par) we have:
E  (Q | R) : (eQ + eR)
and some multiset algebra gives (eQ + eR)6(e+ [〈x˜〉]) so by (Proc Subsum) and
Proposition A.1 (Subject Congruence):
E  P′ : e + [〈x˜〉]
as required.
(3) If P
end 〈x˜〉−→ P′ then by Lemma A.12 (≡ Elimination):
P ≡ end〈x˜〉;Q | R P′ ≡ Q | R
so by Proposition A.1 (Subject Congruence), Lemma A.11 (Subsumption Elimi-
nation) and the type rules (Proc Par) and (Proc End), we have:
E  Q : eQ E  R : eR
{x˜} ⊆ dom(E) (eQ + [〈x˜〉] + eR)6 e
by (Proc Par) we have:
E  (Q | R) : (eQ + eR)
and some multiset algebra gives (eQ + eR)6(e− [〈x˜〉]) so by (Proc Subsum) and
Proposition A.1 (Subject Congruence):
E  P′ : e − [〈x˜〉]
and 〈x˜〉 ∈ e as required.
(4) If P
gen 〈x〉−→ P′ and x =∈ dom(E) then by Lemma A.12 (≡ Elimination):
P ≡ new(x :T ) Q P′ ≡ Q
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so by Proposition A.1 (Subject Congruence), Lemma A.11 (Subsumption Elimi-
nation) and the type rule (Proc Res), we have:
E; x : T  Q :eQ eQ 6 e
so by (Proc Subsum) and Proposition A.1 (Subject Congruence):
E; x : T  P′ :e
as required.
The next lemma is the central fact needed in the proof of safety.
Lemma A.13. If E P : e and P s→P′ and gn(s) ∩ dom(E)=? then ends(s)6
begins(s) + e.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of P s→P′.
(1) If P "→P′′ t→P′ then by Theorem 1 (Subject Reduction), E P′′ : e, so by induc-
tion:
ends(t)6 begins(t) + e
as required.
(2) If P
begin 〈x˜〉−→ P′′ t→P′ and {x˜}∩gn(t)=? then by Theorem 1 (Subject Reduction),
E P′′ : e + [〈x˜〉], so by induction:
ends(t)6 begins(t) + e + [〈x˜〉]
so:
ends(s) = ends(t)
6 begins(t) + e + [〈x˜〉]
= begins(s) + e
as required.
(3) If P
end 〈x˜〉−→ P′′ t→P′ and {x˜}∩ gn(t)=? then by Theorem 1 (Subject Reduction),
E P′′ : e − [〈x˜〉] and 〈x˜〉 ∈ e, so by induction:
ends(t)6 begins(t) + e − [〈x˜〉]
so:
ends(s) = ends(t) + [〈x˜〉]
6 begins(t) + e − [〈x˜〉] + [〈x˜〉]
= begins(t) + e
= begins(s) + e
as required.
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(4) If P
gen 〈x〉−→ P′′ t→P′ and {x}∩ gn(t)=? then by Theorem 1 (Subject Reduction),
we have that E; x:T P′′ : e for some type T , so by induction:
ends(t)6 begins(t) + e
so:
ends(s)6 begins(s) + e
as required.
(5) If P ≡ P′ then s= ”, and so ends(s)= [ ]6e= begins(s) + e.
Proof of Theorem 2. If E P : [ ] then P is safe.
Proof. Suppose that P s→P′ for some trace s and process P′. Without loss of gener-
ality, we may assume that gn(s) ∩ dom(E)=? (we can always suitably rename the
freshly generated names). By Lemma A.13, we have ends(s)6begins(s)+ [ ], that is,
ends(s)6begins(s). Hence, P is safe.
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